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Abstract
This paper builds a game-theoretic model to examine the impact of the Internet shopping infomediary on the
competition between the product or service supplier’s direct online channel and the independent online multi-
brand retailer. It is found that by facilitating cross-channel competition, the infomediary may even help the
supplier to place its brand on the retailer’s shelf. The main insight is that when competing with the supplier’s
direct channel, the independent retailer may prefer to engage in inter-brand competition (i.e., to promote the
competitive substitute brand). In this case, the retailer may decline to carry the supplier’s brand to avoid direct
competition with the direct channel over the same brand. However, by joining an infomediary, the supplier can
make its direct channel more competitive and limit the retailer’s strategic benefit from the inter-brand
competition.  This may increase the possibility that the retailer gives up the inter-brand competition and agrees
to carry the supplier’s brand.
Keywords:  Infomediaries, channel competition, price discrimination, E-commerce
Introduction
The rapid growth of the online shopping infomediary, the Internet institution that helps consumers search prices and compare
brands before purchase, has received significant attention. According to Nielsen/Net Ratings, about 21 million U.S. Internet
visitors surfed through one or more comparison-shopping sites in August 2003, up 34 percent from the previous year. The number
comparison site, shopping.com, sends about $3.6 million worth of business to online merchants per day, and the top four
shopping-comparison sites (with BizRate, NexTag, and PriceGrabber ranking second, third, and fourth) were estimated to turn
$150 million to $200 million in combined revenue in 2003. 
Researchers have noted the role of the Internet infomediary in intensifying the competition between independent retailers (Baye
and Morgan 2001; Chen et al. 2002; Ghose et al. 2003; Iyer and Pazgal 2002). Similarly, the Internet infomediary may also
intensify the competition between the product or service supplier’s direct channel and the independent retailer’s site.  For example,
leading Internet infomediaries can display offers from direct channels and independent retailers (see Table 1 for examples). This
facilitates the direct channel to challenge the retailer’s site. More importantly, suppliers may even strategically engage in such
competition through the infomediary. For example, the hotel brand InterContinental takes an aggressive approach in using its
brand name in paid-for Internet searches. It has spent heavily in bidding up the keyword “InterContinental” (at $3, while Hilton
bids just 58 cents for its own brand names) in search engines to have its Website come at the top of the lists consumers see (Liu
and Yee 2004).
The direct versus retailer channel competition has been identified as a source of conflict, even without considering the impact of
an Internet infomediary.  Distributors and dealers tend to desert those suppliers who sell directly and only carry products from
suppliers who do not compete with them (Wilson 1998). For example, Wal-Mart and Home Depot warned Black and Decker that
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Table 1.  Sample Offers from Direct Channels versus Retailers Found at the
Top Four Internet Shopping Infomediaries
Shopping.com Bizrate.com Nextag.com PriceGrabber.com
Product
IBM ThinkPad T40
2373 (237372U) PC
Notebook
HEWLETT
PACKARD
PhotoSmart 945 5.3
Megapixels Digital
Camera
Wyndham Franklin Plaza
Philadelphia, PA
(1-Adult room, 12/10/04-
12/11/04)
Fossil Abacus Wrist Net
Watch
Direct
Channel IBM.com HPshopping.com Wyndham.com Fossil.com
Retailer Buy.com OfficeDepot.com HotelWeb.com Circuitcity.com
Price Lower price atBuy.com Same
Marginally lower rate at
Wyndham.com Same
they would take its products off their shelves should Black and Decker expend direct sales (Lee et al. 2003). Therefore,
considering both the retailer’s strategic brand assortment and the Internet infomediary’s capability in intensifying the cross-
channel competition, we ask the following specific question concerning the impact of the Internet infomediary:
When the Internet shopping infomediary facilitates the competition between the supplier’s direct channel and
the multi-brand independent retailer, does it necessarily decrease the chance that the retailer carries the
supplier’s brand?
In this paper, we build up a game-theoretic model to study the competition between a supplier’s direct channel and an independent
retailer which can potentially carry multiple brands. Our model also incorporates an infomediary which can strategically determine
its contractual relationship with each channel. Interestingly and surprisingly, we find that the infomediary’s facilitation of cross-
channel competition may even help the supplier to place its brand on the retailer’s shelf.  The key insight is that the direct channel
and independent retailer favor different types of cross-channel competition. The supplier’s direct channel favors intra-brand
competition over its own brand, while the independent retailer favors inter-brand competition over different brands (for
differentiation). Therefore, if the retailer carries a competitive substitute brand to engage in inter-brand competition with the direct
channel, it will decline to carry the supplier’s brand which leads to intra-brand competition.  However, the presence of an
infomediary, as a mechanism for price discrimination and profit squeezing, limits the retailer’s incentive to benefit from inter-
brand competition. As a consequence, the retailer will be encouraged to expand the brand assortment rather than concentrating
more on cross-channel competition. In this sense, the infomediary is indispensable to the supplier’s strategic design of multi-
channel online distribution system. 
The rest of the paper is organized as the follows.  First, we review related literature on Internet infomediaries, shopping agents,
and cross-channel competition. A game-theoretic model is then presented to compare between different cases of cross-channel
competition with and without the infomediary.  The major managerial insights generated from the analysis are discussed and the
conclusions presented.
Related Literature
Baye and Morgan (2001) and Iyer and Pazgal (2002) model the competition in homogenous good market where Internet shopping
agent allows consumers to easily compare prices among different retailers. In these two models, retailers can choose whether or
not to disclose their exact store prices to the shopping agent, but do not quote a different price (from the store price) to the
shopping agent. In the models developed by Chen et al. (2002) and by Ghose et al. (2003), however, retailers can quote a different
price (from their offline store prices) to the Internet infomediary, who then helps consumers compare among different retailers.
Therefore, in these two models, the Internet infomediary is a way for retailers to price discriminate.  Chen et al. and Ghose et al.
focus on the automobile retail environment where posted store prices are not common. However, we adopt this approach of
modeling the infomediary as a price discrimination mechanism in the study of general retail environments. We consider that this
price discrimination assumption is not unreasonable. For example, the recent industry watch (Salkever 2003) reports that the real-
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Manufacture A
The Retailer
Direct Site, 
and 
The Infomediary
Quote 
Consumer
Brand A
Brand BOutside 
Supplier pA pB
pSAQuote or pSB
pSA or pSB
pSD
pSD
pD
time pricing data listed in comparison sites are increasingly being actively fed by major retailers themselves with elaborate Web
sites and technology staff, rather than being passively extracted by comparison sites.  In addition, aside from directing traffic, the
shopping agents also sell to retailers the data that tracks shopper behavior.  Therefore, it is clear that soon online retailers will
combine such information with individual marketing strategies (e.g., electronic coupons) to target and discriminate specific
shopper segments. 
In terms of modeling technique, this paper also blends the research by Chiang et al. (2003), which examines the competition
between a manufacturer’s direct channel and an independent retailer over a single brand, and by Lal and Villas-Boas (1998),
which examines the retail channel competition over multiple brands. Our model examines the competition between the supplier’s
direct channel and an independent retailer over multiple brands.  
Model
There is a risk-neutral supplier (supplier A) selling brand A of a product. Supplier A owns a direct channel (i.e., an official direct-
transaction Website) through which it sells directly to consumers. There is an independent risk-neutral retailer already carrying
brand B of the same product, and the retailer also owns a Website selling the product to consumers. Aside from brand B, the
retailer can decide whether or not to carry brand A. 
In the world with no infomediary, the direct site charges a regular price pD  for brand A. The retailer charges a regular price  pB
for brand B, and charges a regular price pA  for brand A if it carries brand A. In the world with an infomediary, if a site is enrolled
by the infomediary, the site can quote to the infomediary a referral price for a specific brand which can be different from the
corresponding regular price on this brand. For notational convenience, we use pSi  to denote the price quote in addition to the
corresponding regular price pi, i , {A, B, D} (e.g., in addition to pD , the direct site can quote a pSD  on brand A to be displayed
in the infomediary site for the purpose of referral, etc.).  All prices are set simultaneously. Figure 1 depicts the channel competition
in the presence of the infomediary (suppose the retailer carries both brands A and B, and the infomediary enrolls both sites).
We assume a unit density of consumers in the market. Consumers have a unit demand for the product. The consumers’ reservation
value of the product is normalized to 1. Regarding both consumer brand preferences and searching behaviors, we assume that there
are a total of six groups of consumers, as shown in Figure 2. 
Regarding consumers’ brand preferences, we assume that there are three types of buyers. First, there is a segment of retail
shoppers who have no special brand preference and would like to buy the cheaper brand. We call these consumers R-buyers and
assume that a proportion R of the whole consumer population is R-buyers; second, there is a segment of consumers who only buy
brand B. We call these consumers B-buyers and assume that a proportion B of the whole consumer population is B-buyers; third,
there is a segment of consumers who only buy brand A. We call these consumers A-buyers and assume that a proportion A of the
whole consumer population is A-buyers. Therefore, A + B + R = 1. 
Figure 1.  Multi-Brand, Cross-Channel Competition with the Infomediary
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R-buyer (R)
B-buyer (B)
R-searcher (Rα)
R-non-searcher (R(1 - α))
B-searcher (Bα)
B-non-searcher (B(1 - α))Consumers(1) *In brackets are 
proportions out of 
the whole 
consumer 
population
A-buyer (A)
A-searcher (Aα)
A-non-searcher (A(1 - α))
search
not search
search
not search
buy 
brand A
buy 
brand B
buy cheaper 
brand 
search
not search
6 groups
Figure 2.  Consumer Segmentation Based on Brand Preferences and Searching Behaviors
Regarding consumers’ searching behaviors, we assume that there are two types of consumers: searchers and non-searchers. We
assume that for each segment of i-buyers (i , {A, B, D}), a fraction " of them are searchers and we call them i-searchers; a
fraction 1 – "  of them are non-searchers and we call them i-non-searchers. (For example, a fraction " of B-buyers are B-searchers
and a fraction 1 – "  of B-buyers are B-non-searchers, etc.).
We assume that i-searchers (i , {A, B, D})  have arbitrarily small search cost and can find any site (i.e., the direct site, the retailer
site, or the infomediary site if there is one). Therefore, A-searchers (B-searchers) buy from the site with the cheapest offer on
brand A (brand B). R-searchers buy from the site with the cheapest offer, regardless of which brand it is. In contrast, we assume
that without the infomediary, i-non-searchers (i , {A, B, D}) do not search and only visit one site. Therefore, they buy from the
only site they visit. Specifically, we assume that B-non-searchers (B(1 – "))  only visit the retailer site to buy brand B.  R-non-
searchers (R(1 – "))  only visit the retailer site to buy the cheaper brand.  This reflects the fact that online retailer sites are
normally the places that can potentially let consumers choose among different brands. Finally, A-non-searchers (A(1 – "))  only
visit the direct site to buy brand A. This reflects the fact that the direct channels are often designed to facilitate the transaction
for these brand-loyal consumers.  To reflect the fact that the infomediary can reduce search cost, we assume that with the
infomediary, in addition to the fraction " of i-searchers, another fraction $ of i-buyers, who are i-non-searchers, can access the
infomediary.  In the rest of the paper, for convenience of expression, we denote "' = " + $. 
It is worth remarking that under our assumptions, selling through the retailer does not generate more sales from brand-loyal
consumers (i.e., A-buyers) for supplier A. Moreover, if the retailer carries brand A, the direct-versus-retailer channel competition
also lowers the direct channel’s profits from A-buyers. However, placing brand A on the retailer’s shelf allows supplier A to
expose its brand to those R-non-searchers on the retailer’s site.  Therefore, supplier A is willing to sell through the retailer only
when there are enough R-non-searchers visiting the retailer’s site. To ensure supplier A’s incentive to sell through the retailer,
we assume that R is reasonably large, i.e., A < R < A/(1 – "). , to facilitate the analysis. 
We assume that the marginal costs for both brands are zero and that the retailer earns the same share of total profits generated
from selling brand A and from selling brand B.  Therefore, the retailer’s objective is always to maximize the total revenue from
selling all the brands it carries. This assumption simplifies the model by excluding the impact of wholesale competition on the
brand assortment decision. We assume that as long as carrying brand A does not hurt the retailer’s total expected profit (i.e.,
weakly increases its total expected profit), the retailer is willing to expand the brand assortment by carrying brand A. We first
examine the world without an infomediary. We analyze both the situations where the retailer carries only brand B and where the
retailer carries both of two brands.  In both cases, the direct site and the retailer site simultaneously choose their prices and
compete.
No Infomediary, the Retailer Carries Only Brand B
This case collapses to a standard model of price competition as in Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988). The direct site has a
captive segment of A, since all of the A-searchers (A") and half of A-non-searchers will patronize and buy brand A from the direct
Xue et al./Impact of Internet Shopping Infomediaries
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site. The retailer has a captive segment of B + R(1 – "), since all of the B-buyers (B) and R-non-searchers (R(1 – ") buy brand
B from the retailer. Since the R-searchers (R") can patronize both the direct site and the retailer and buy from the site offering
the lower price, there is a switching segment of R". 
Following Varian and Narasimhan, it is easy to verify that this price competition does not have a pure-strategy equilibrium but
only has a mixed-strategy equilibrium. The expected equilibrium profits for the direct site (denoted as ) and the retailer1
D
NΠ
(denoted as ) are contingent on the value of B.  Proposition 1 presents this result.   1
R
NΠ
Proposition 1: If B < A – R(1 – "), , . If B > A – R(1 – ") ,1DN AΠ = 1 ( )RN
A B R
A Rα
Π = +
+
[ ] [ ]1 (1 )DN B R A RB R
α
α
+ −
Π = ⋅ +
+
.1 (1 )
R
N B R αΠ = + −
Proposition 1 can be better explained by the notion of each site’s incentive to lower price.  Following Lal and Villas-Boas (1998),
a site’s incentive to lower price on brand i can be measured by
       
    '       
the sizeof switching segment for brand i
the sizeof a site s captive segment for brand i
The larger this measure, the more willing a site is to offer a lower price on brand   to attract the switching segment of consumers.i
For example, the direct site has a captive segment A on brand A, and the captive segment for the retailer is B + R(1 – "). The
switching segment on brand B is R". Therefore, the direct site’s incentive to lower pD is  R"/A, and the retailer’s incentive to lower
pB is R"/[B + R(1 – ")].  Note when B > A – R(1 – "),  the direct site’s incentive to lower pD is (weakly) higher than the retailer’s
incentive to lower pB  Then in equilibrium, the average level of pD is (weakly) lower than the average level of pB , and the retailer’s
expected profit is equal to its guaranteed profit level B + R(1 – ")  (i.e., as if it charges pB = 1  and only sells to its captive segment
B + R(1 – "); Narasimhan has the formal proof of this feature). Similarly, when B < A – R(1 – "), the retailer’s incentive to lower
pB  is higher than the direct site’s incentive to lower pD . In equilibrium, the average level of pD  is higher than the average level
of pB, and the direct site’s expected profit is equal to its guaranteed profit level A. 
No Infomediary, the Retailer Carries Both Brands
Next, consider the case that in addition to brand B, the retailer also carries brand A at no additional cost. Since there is no
difference between the profit margins of these two brands, the retailer is willing to promote only one brand at most. The appendix
shows that when the retailer carries both brands, it always charges pB = 1 and pA  < 1 in any equilibrium. In other words, the
retailer will only use brand A to compete with the direct site for those searching consumers. The intuition is that if the retailer
promotes brand B, the retailer can only compete with the direct site for those R-searchers, whereas, by promoting brand A, the
retailer can compete for both A-searchers and R-searchers. Therefore, the retailer engages in direct competition with the direct
channel over brand A to attract more searchers.
Consider the competition between two sites over brand A. The retailer site has a captive segment of R(1 – ") on brand A.  To see
that, note that R-non-searchers (R(1 – ")) buy brand A from the retailer rather than brand B because pA <  pB = 1. The direct site
has a captive segment of A(1 – ") on brand A. There is a switching segment of (A + R)" on brand A since all of A-searchers (A")
and R-searchers (R") will choose between buying brand A from the direct site and buying brand A (since pA < pB) from the retailer
site, depending on which site offers the lower price. Therefore, the mixed-strategy equilibrium for this case can also be derived
following the standard approach used by Varian and by Narasimhan (see the appendix for the expression of the equilibrium). The
expected profits for the direct site (denoted as ) and the retailer (denoted as ) are presented in Proposition 2.  By2
D
NΠ 2
R
NΠ
comparing  with , Proposition 2 also reveals how the retailer’s willingness to carry brand A is contingent on the value2
R
NΠ 1
R
NΠ
of B. 
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Proposition 2:  (a) In equilibrium, , ; (b) When B > (<) A – R(1 – "), the retailer2 (1 )RN B R αΠ = + − [ ]2
(1 )D
N
R A R
R A
α
α
α
−Π = ⋅ +
+
is (not) willing to carry brand A, i.e., . ( )2 1R RN NΠ ≥ < Π
As Proposition 2 reveals, the retailer is not willing to carry brand A when the size of B-buyers is small enough (i.e.,
B < A – R(1 – ")). The reason is that, in this case, by carrying only brand B, the retailer can benefit from the inter-brand
competition with the direct site. In such an inter-brand competition, the retailer’s incentive to lower pB is higher than the direct
site’s incentive to lower pD  and, therefore, the retailer will have a higher probability than the direct site to capture the switching
segment. However, if the retailer carries two brands, due to the arrangement of the whole category, it can only engage in intra-
brand competition (over brand A) with the direct site. In such competition, the retailer’s incentive to lower pA (which is
) is lower than the direct site’s incentive to lower pD (which is ), and then the retailer always has a lower
( )
(1 )
A R
R
α
α
+
−
( )
(1 )
A R
A
α
α
+
−
probability to capture the switching segment. 
With Infomediary
When there is an infomediary, we model a sequential bargaining process between the infomediary and the two sites. That is,
before the two sites compete, the infomediary can negotiate with each site sequentially and determine with which site to negotiate
first. In negotiating with each site, the infomediary makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer and the site decides whether or not to take
it. If the retailer (the direct site) agrees to enroll, then the retailer (the direct site) has to pay the infomediary a per-referral-fee
cR (cD) for every consumer who visits the infomediary and may potentially buy from this site. It is worth noting that in equilibrium,
the infomediary can rationally expect the exact proportion of consumers who could potentially buy from each site through the
infomediary. Therefore, all the results remain the same if the infomediary implements a lump-sum fixed fee rather than per-
referral-fee. 
If a site quotes a price pSi  to the infomediary, the site will charge the corresponding regular price pi = 1 since only non-searchers
will buy at pi  and they will never defect. 
The Retailer Carries Only Brand B
In this case, the infomediary cannot enroll both the retailer’s site and the direct site. To see that, suppose that the infomediary
enrolls both sites, exclusive of the per-referral-fee. Since  pD = 1, pB = 1, pSD <  1, pSB < 1, the fraction "' of consumers who can
access the infomediary site will buy through the infomediary. The direct site’s incentive to lower pSD  is R/A (i.e., a captive
segment of A"' and a switching segment of R"'), and the retailer’s incentive to lower pSB  is R/B (i.e., a captive segment of B"' and
a switching segment of R"'). If B < A, the direct site’s incentive to lower its price pSD  is smaller and its expected profit from
searching consumers is just A"'. Therefore, the total profit for the direct site is still A"' + A(1 – "') = A, which is equal to the direct
site’s expected total profit if it is not enrolled.  Since the direct site cannot improve its expected total profit, it has no incentive
to be enrolled. Similarly, if B > A, the retailer’s expected total profit is still B + R(1 – "') if it is enrolled, and, therefore, the retailer
has no incentive to be enrolled. 
Since it cannot happen that both sites are enrolled, if the infomediary negotiates with one site first and that site accepts the contract
to enroll, the other site will decide not to enroll even if the infomediary can enroll it for free. However, if the first site rejects, there
are two different subcases. First, the infomediary can still negotiate with and enroll the other side; second, the other site will never
decide to enroll (even if it is free to enroll). Denote  ( )  as the expected profit for the retailer (the direct site), exclusiveˆRπ ˆDπ
of the per-referral-fee, when only the retailer is enrolled; denote  ( ) as the expected profit for the retailer (the direct site),Rπ% Dπ%
exclusive of the per-referral-fee, when only the direct site is enrolled (see the appendix for the expressions of , , ,ˆRπ ˆDπ Rπ%
). Consider the first subcase. If ,  it is optimal for the infomediary to first negotiate with theDπ% ( )ˆ ˆR R D Dπ π π π− > < −% %
retailer (the direct site), enroll it, and receive a total payment of  ( ). The negotiation with the other side willˆR Rπ π− % ˆD Dπ π− %
not happen and is just an off-equilibrium threat. Such contract strategies have an important business implication: the infomediary
can leverage the competitive threat of one channel to squeeze the total benefit of enrolling from the other channel. Consider the
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second subcase. If ,  it is optimal for the infomediary to first negotiate with the retailer (the direct( )1 1ˆ ˆR DR N D Nπ π− Π > < − Π
site), enroll it, and receive a total payment of  ( ). The infomediary’s equilibrium strategies are summarized1ˆ
R
R Nπ − Π 1ˆ
D
D Nπ − Π
by Proposition 3 (see the appendix for details). In Proposition 3,  ( ) denotes the expected profit for the direct site (the1
D
IΠ 1
R
IΠ
retailer) in this case. 
Proposition 3:  In equilibrium, suppose that A"' – R(1 – "') > 0, then
(a) If A"' –R(1 – "') < B < A(A < B < A/"'), the infomediary negotiates with the retailer first and enrolls only the retailer (the
direct site). In equilibrium, cR (cD) is chosen such that it satisfies that  and . 1 (1 ')
R
I B R αΠ = + − 1
D
I AΠ =
(b) If B < A"' – R(1 – "')(B > A/"'), the infomediary negotiates with the retailer (the direct site) first and enrolls only the retailer
(the direct site). In equilibrium, cR (cD) is chosen such that it satisfies that  and . 1 1
R R
I NΠ = Π 1 1
D D
I NΠ = Π
The Retailer Carries Both Brands
When the retailer carries both brands, it cannot happen that both the retailer and supplier A enroll with brand A. If so, the price
competition will force both sites to engage in marginal-cost-pricing in quoting prices (i.e., exclusive of the per-referral-fee,
pSA = pSD = 0), and both sites cannot improve their profitability by selling to searching buyers. This is the standard outcome of
Bertrand competition. 
However, it is possible that the two sites are both enrolled but quote prices on different brands to the infomediary, i.e., the direct
site quotes pSD on brand A and retailer quotes a pSB on brand B. This can happen when B is sufficiently small so that the retailer’s
incentive to lower pSB is larger than the direct site’s incentive to lower pSD. In this case, the purpose for the direct site to be enrolled
by the infomediary is to use the quote price pSD to attract those A-searchers as well as R-searchers, while the purpose for the
retailer site to be enrolled is to use pSD to attract only R-searchers. However, if B is not small enough, the retailer has no incentive
to enroll with brand B since brand B is not sufficiently competitive to attract those R-searchers. Proposition 4 summarizes the
equilibrium of the case when the retailer carries both brands.  
Proposition 4: There exists a  such that: Bˆ A<
(a) If , the infomediary negotiates with the direct site first and enrolls only the direct site. In equilibrium, cD is chosenˆB B≥
such that it satisfies that , . 2 (1 ')
R
I B R αΠ = + − ( )2 1 'DI A αΠ = −
(b) If , either of the following two equilibrium cases may occur: ˆB B<
(b1) The infomediary negotiates with the retailer first and enrolls only the retailer with brand A. 
(b2) The infomediary negotiates with the direct site first and negotiates with the retailer second. The direct site is enrolled
with brand A and the retailer is enrolled with brand B. 
In either case, the per-referral-fee cR and cD (if applicable) are chosen such that it satisfies that  and2 (1 ')
R
I B R αΠ = + −
. ( )2 1 'DI A αΠ = −
The enrolling of two sites with different brands reflects the retailer’s intention to differentiate itself in order to avoid direct price
competition (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003). It also allows the infomediary to extract profits from both sites.  However, the sequence
of negotiation matters. The infomediary should negotiate with the direct site first and with the retailer second. If the direct site
chooses not to enroll (in off-equilibrium), then the infomediary can enroll the retailer with brand A and the direct site suffers a
loss. Therefore, by doing so, the infomediary can leverage the threat of enrolling the retailer with brand A to extract more profit
from the direct site. 
The comparison between the retailer’s expected profits in Propositions 3 and 4 immediately concludes the retailer’s willingness
to carry brand A in presence of the infomediary. Proposition 5 illustrates this result. 
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Proposition 5:  Suppose that A"' – R(1 – "') > 0.
(a) In the presence of the infomediary, if B > (<) A"' – R(1 – "'), the retailer is (not) willing to carry brand A, i.e.,
.( )2 1R RI IΠ ≥ < Π
(b) If "' < A(1 – ")/(A + R), then for A"' – R(1 – "') < B < A – R(1 – "), the retailer is  (not) willing to carry brand A in presence
(absence) of the infomediary. 
Proposition 5 also characterizes the situation where the presence of infomediary can increase the possibility that the retailer carries
brand A. Recall that Proposition 2 reveals that when B < A – R(1 – "),  the retailer can benefit from inter-brand competition with
the direct channel if there is no infomediary. However, with an infomediary, such a capability of the retailer is limited. Consider
the case when the retailer only carries brand B. When A "' – R(1 – "') < B < A – R(1 – ")  and only the direct channel is enrolled,
the direct site’s incentive to lower pSD will be larger than the retailer’s incentive to lower pB. Therefore, the expected profit for the
retailer cannot be more than its guaranteed profit level B + R(1 – "') if it only carries brand B. Note in equilibrium, even though
it may be the case that the retailer (rather than the direct site) is enrolled or both channels are enrolled, the infomediary can still
leverage the competitive threat from the direct site to squeeze profit from the retailer so that the retailer’s expected profit, net of
the total payment to the infomediary, is still B + R(1 – "'). 
Since "' = " + $, "' < A(1 – ")/(A + B)  is equivalent to . It implies that when either "  or $ becomes
2A A R
A R A R
β α+< −
+ +
larger, the presence of infomedairy is less likely to enhance the opportunity that the retailer carries brand A. The intuition is that
as " or $ increases, more brand-loyal consumers of brand A will buy through the infomediary. Hence, it also becomes harder for
the direct site to quote a competitive pSA to discourage the retailer from promoting the other brand. The role of the infomediary
as a weapon for price discrimination is thus undermined. 
Supplier A’s Dual-Channel Profitability
Note that in the world with infomediary and "' < A(1 – ")/(A + R), A "' – R(1 – "') < B < A – R(1 – "), , due to the infomediary’s
profit squeezing, the direct site’s expected profit is only A(1 – "'),  which is less than its expected profit without the infomediary.
However, since the retailer will carry and promote brand A, supplier A can profit from selling to R-non-searchers who only buy
from the retailer site. For example, if we assume that supplier A earns a share D of the total profit of selling brand A at the retailer
site, then the total dual-channel profit for supplier A is A(1 – "') + DR(1 – "').  Since supplier A’s expected profit without the
infomediary is  (when the retailer does not carry brand B and A "' – R(1 – "') < B < A – R(1 – ")),  if ,1DN AΠ = '
R
A R
ρ
α
ρ
<
+
supplier A benefits by selling through both sites. That is, the infomediary allows supplier A to profitably extend the sales of brand
A to the retailer site only when "', the proportion of consumers who use the infomediary, is not too high. If "' is too high (i.e., too
many consumers can compare the prices from the two sites), the channel competition will be intensified too much and enable the
infomediary to squeeze too much profit from the two sites.
Main Managerial Insights
In this section, we summarize the two key insights of our model which explain why the presence of an infomediary can increase
the opportunity for the independent retailer to carry a certain brand even if the infomediary may actually intensify the competition
between the retail channel and the brand supplier’s direct channel. 
First, the retailer may decline to carry brand A when it has a competitive substitute brand B to compete with supplier A’s direct
site.  This reflects features of the multi-brand retailer’s strategy of category management.  In category management, which is
based on the performance of the whole product line rather than single brand, the retailer may be cautious about cutting the price
of a specific brand and intensify the intra-category brand competition (Basuroy et al. 2001). Also, in many cases, multi-brand
retailers prefer to avoid head-to-head price competition with the supplier’s direct channel over the same brand. For example, to
penalize hotels who offer significant price cutting in their own sites, the online intermediary Expedia moves them to the bottom
of the hotel list to decrease their attraction to the Expedia visitors (Mullaney and Grover 2003). 
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Second, the presence of the infomediary may decrease the opportunity for the retailer to benefit from the inter-brand competition
with the supplier’s direct channel and, therefore, increase the chance that the retailer carries brand A. If the infomediary allows
the direct site to quote competitive prices, then the infomediary itself can also take advantage of this competitive threat to squeeze
profit from the retailer. This profit squeezing in cross-channel competition decreases the retailer’s incentive to engage in intensive
inter-brand competition with the direct channel. Consequently, the retailer is less concerned about how to compete with the direct
channel by heavily promoting a competing brand, and is more likely to expand its brand assortment by carrying brand A. Supplier
A can also benefit by the expansion of its distribution channels. 
Concluding Remarks
This paper complements existing literature on the Internet infomediary by considering its impact on direct-versus-retailer channel
competition, and the multi-brand retailer’s brand assortment decision. The important message conveyed is that the supplier can
even rely on the competitive mechanism caused by the infomediary to motivate the independent retailer to carry its brand. Based
on its strategic negotiation with different channels, the infomediary can decrease the chance that the retailer excludes the supplier’s
brand and uses another competitive substitute brand to compete with the supplier’s direct channel. There are many promising
extensions to remove the limitations of this model and supplement this study. First, we assume that the wholesale relationship
between the supplier and the retailer is constant share-of-profit. Other more realistic contract mechanisms in the wholesale
relationship, such as per unit wholesale price, can be considered. Second, the analysis can be extended to the scenario where the
infomediary cannot discriminate between the direct channel and the independent retailer in terms of enrollment payment.  In that
case, the infomediary’s profit squeezing capability is limited. Third, the analysis can also be extended to the case where the
proportion of searchers is different across different consumer segments. Also, empirical study on the infomediary’s contract
arrangements with different channels is a worthwhile direction for future research.   
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Appendix
Proposition 1:  The mixed-strategy equilibrium can be derived following the approach in Varian (1988) and Narasimhan (1988).
Denote , .  In equilibrium, the direct site (the retailer) randomly charges pD (pB)( ) ( )PrB BF x p x= ≤ ( ) ( )PrD DF x p x= ≤
over the same interval [pS, 1] with a distribution function  . If ,   ,( )DF x ( )( )BF x (1 )B A R α≥ − − (1 )S B Rp B R
α+ −
=
+
, ;  i f   ,  ,( ) (1 )( )D R x B RF x xR
α
α
− − +
= ( ) (1 )B B R A RF x x B R xR
α α
α
+ − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
= −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ (1 )B A R α< − −
(1 )
S
B Rp
B R
α+ −
=
+
, . The expected profits are in Proposition 1. ( )D A B RF x x A R xRα α
+⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞
= − ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥+⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠ ( )
(1 )
B
xR x AF x
xR
α
α
− −
=
Proposition 2:  If the retailer only promotes brand A (brand B) at a price p < pD, it makes a profit of p[R + A"] + B  (a profit of
p(B + R)).  Therefore, promoting brand B is always the retailer’s best-response strategy. Denote . In( ) ( )PrA AF x p x= ≤
equilibrium, pB = 1,  the direct site (the retailer) randomly charges  pD(pA) over the same interval [pS , 1] with a distribution
f u n c t i o n  F D ( x )  .  S i n c e  R  >  A ,  ,  ,( )( )AF x (1 )S Rp A R
α
α
−
=
+
( ) (1 )
( )D
R A RF x x
A R x A R
α α
α α
⎡ ⎤− +⎡ ⎤
= − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
. The expected profits are in Proposition 2. ( ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )( )A
x A R x RF x
x A R
α α
α
+ − − −
=
+
Proposition 3:  Denote , . ( ) ( )PrSB SBF x p x= ≤ ( ) ( )PrSD SDF x p x= ≤
Table A1.  Equilibrium Contingencies of Proposition 3
( )' 1 'B A Rα α≤ − − ( )' 1 'A R B Aα α− − < < / 'A B A α< < 'B A α≥
When only
the retailer is
enrolled
, , 
' (1 )
( )
'
SB
xR x A
F x
xR
α
α
− −
= ( ) ( )'D A B RF x x A R xRα += − +⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ 1Bp =
, ˆD Aπ = ˆ ( )(1 ') ( ) ''R
A
B R B R
A R
π α α
α
= + − + +
+
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
N/A
When only
the direct site
is enrolled
N/A
, ,
' (1 )( )
( )
'
SD
R x B R
F x
xR
α
α
− − +
= ( ) (1 ')B B R A RF x x
B R xR
α+ − +
= −
+
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
pD = 1, ,( )(1 ')R B Rπ α= + −%
( ) ( )1 '(1 ') 'D B RA A R
B R
α
π α α
+ −
= − + +
+
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The optimal
per-referral-
fee ( )
1ˆ
'
R
R N
Rc
B R
π
α
− Π
=
+
 ( )
ˆ
'
R R
Rc
B R
π π
α
−
=
+
%
(offered to the retailer only)
 (offered to( )
ˆ
'
D D
Dc
A R
π π
α
−
=
+
%
the direct site only)
( )
1ˆ
'
D
D N
Dc
A R
π
α
− Π
=
+
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When B < A"' – R(1 – "'), the direct site never has the incentive to be enrolled but the retailer always has the incentive to enroll.
It is because the retailer’s incentive to lower pB is so large that even when only the direct site is enrolled, the direct site’s expected
profit is still A, which is equal to . The optimal contract strategy for the infomediary is to first (and also only) negotiate with1
D
NΠ
the retailer and charge  to enroll it. The infomediary obtains a total payment of  (since a total( )
1ˆ
'
R
R N
Rc B R
π
α
− Π
=
+ 1
ˆ RR Nπ − Π
proportion (B + R)"' of consumers visit the infomediary and can potentially buy from the retailer’s site). Similarly, when
B > A"' < R(1 – "'), A, the retailer never has the incentive to be enrolled, and the infomediary only enrolls the direct site with
. ( )
1ˆ
'
D
D N
Dc A R
π
α
− Π
=
+
When A"' – R(1 – "') < B < A, the retailer still always has the incentive to be enrolled, but the direct site has the incentive to be
enrolled only when the retailer is not enrolled. It is optimal for the infomediary to negotiate with the retailer first. If (off the
equilibrium) the retailer does not accept the offer, later the direct site will be enrolled and the retailer’s expected profit would be
. Therefore the infomediary can charge a per-referral-fee   to enroll the retailer. In equilibrium, theRπ% ( )
ˆ
'
R R
Rc B R
π π
α
−
=
+
%
negotiation with the direct site will not happen and is just an off-equilibrium threat. If the infomediary negotiates first with the
direct site and second with the retailer, the direct site will not accept any contract due to the potential negotiation threat from the
retailer. Then the infomediary can only enroll the retailer and charge .  Therefore, the infomediary should( )
1ˆ
'
R
R N
Rc B R
π
α
− Π
=
+
negotiate with the retailer first. Similarly, when  A < B < A/"', the direct site always has the incentive to be enrolled but the retailer
has the incentive to be enrolled only when the direct site is not enrolled.  The infomediary negotiates first with the direct site and
charges a per-referral-fee  . In equilibrium, only the direct site enrolls. ( )
1ˆ
'
D
D N
Dc A R
π
α
− Π
=
+
Proposition 4:  Consider the case when both sites are enrolled, exclusive of any payment to the infomediary. Note the direct site
(the retailer) will only quote pSD (pSB) on brand A (brand B), and in equilibrium pB = 1 and pD = 1. The retailer randomizes pA over
an interval {k, 1] to compete for A-searchers and randomizes pSB over an interval [pS, k] to compete for R-searchers, where k and
pS are to be determined. The direct site randomizes pSD over an interval [pS, 1] to compete for A-searchers as well as R-searchers.
This case is identical to the model in Chen et al. (2002) where a firm randomizes two prices to compete with the other firm
randomizing only one price. Since the direct site’s incentive to lower pSD is larger than the retailer’s incentive to lower pA and
smaller than the retailer’s incentive to lower pSB (otherwise, the retailer has no incentive to be enrolled with brand B), the expected
profit that the direct site can earn from the proportion (A + R)"' of consumers who visit the infomediary is A "'k. 
Denote . Then k, pS, 2 can be determined by the following equations: ( )Pr sdob p kθ = ≥
(1)( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 ' ' 1 ' 1 1 'R k A R kRα α α θ θ α− = + − + − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
(2)( ) ( ) ( )' 1 ' 'SB R k B k p B Rθ α θ α α+ + − = ⋅ +
(3)S
Akp
A R
=
+
Eq. (1) implies that the retailer is indifferent between charging any  . Eq. (2) implies that the retailer is indifferent[ ],1Ap k∈
between charging any . Eq. (2) implies that pS is the lowest value the direct site is willing to charge for pSD.,SB Sp p k⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦
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Therefore,   and  .  To guarantee that, in this case, the retailer has the incentive to be enrolled
A B
A R
θ −=
+
( )
( )
1 '
1 ' '
R
k
R A
α
α α θ
−
=
− +
with brand B, we should have , where  is the lowest value of  pSD that the retailer is willing to charge if it isS
Bp
B R
>
+
B
B R+
enrolled with brand B. Trivial algebra shows that  is negative at B = A, positive at B = 0, and monotonicallyS
Bp
B R
−
+
decreasing in B for B , [0, A]. Therefore, there exists a positive  such that for , when the direct site is enrolled withBˆ A< ˆB B≤
brand A, the retailer has the incentive to be enrolled with brand B. In this mixed-strategy equilibrium, the retailer’s expected profit
is ; the direct site’s expected profit is . Denote( )( ) ( )1 ' 'R AkR B B RA Rπ α α= + − + ⋅ ++
( ( )1 ' 'D A A kπ α α= − +(
 for  ,   for ,  for  .( ) ( )PrSB SBF x p x= ≤ ,Sx p k⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ ( ) ( )PrSD SDF x p x= ≤ ,1Sx p⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ ( ) ( )PrA AF x p x= ≤ [ ],1x k∈
Then the equilibrium price distribution functions are  for  and( ) (1 ) (1 ')1
'SD
x RF x
A x
α
α
− −
= − [ ],1x k∈
 for  .  .  .( ) ( )( )SSD x p B RF x xR
− +
= ),Sx p k⎡∈ ⎣ ( ) ( )1SB A k xF x xR−= − ( ) 1A kF x x= −
When , the retailer has no incentive to enroll with brand B. Either site is willing to enroll with brand A if the other siteˆB B>
is not enrolled. In this case, it is optimal for the infomediary to negotiate with and enroll the direct site. The infomediary can,
therefore, earn . Otherwise if the infomediary chooses to enroll the retailer site, it can only earn .ˆD Dπ π− % ˆ ˆR R D Dπ π π π− < −% %
The final expected profits (net of referral payment) are as presented in Proposition 4 (a).  When , the infomediary has twoˆB B≤
potential strategies:  (1) only enroll the retailer with brand A (since the direct site will not choose to enroll if the retailer does);
(2) enroll both sites with different brands. For (1), the infomediary has to negotiate with the retailer first, charge a
 and receive a total payment of .  For (2), the infomediary has to negotiate with the direct site first and( )
ˆ
'
R R
Rc B R
π π
α
−
=
+
%
ˆR Rπ π− %
with the retailer second.  It charges a  to the direct site and a   to the retailer. In total, the( )
ˆ
'
D D
Dc A R
π π
α
−
=
+
(
( )
ˆ
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R R
Rc B R
π π
α
−
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+
(
infomediary receives a payment of . Therefore, the infomediary will choose strategy (a) (strategy (b))( ) ( )ˆ ˆD D R Rπ π π π− + −( (
if .  However, in either case, it satisfies that  and( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆR R D D R Rπ π π π π π− > < − + −( (% 2 ( )(1 ')RI R A R Bπ αΠ = = + − +%
 since the infomediary always extracts all the benefits of being enrolled. ( )2 ˆ 1 'DI D Aπ αΠ = = −
